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We study the evolution of the wage diﬀerentials between graduate
(skilled) and non graduate (unskilled) workers in several european coun-
tries in the period that range from the beginning of the nineties to the
beginning of this century. The starting point is that all european coun-
tries show an increasing relative supply of skilled workers but diﬀerent
behaviours of the wage diﬀerentials. The standard explanation for non
decreasing diﬀerentials in the face of rising relative supply is that techno-
logical progress is skill biased. This in turn would imply that technological
progress diﬀers in its magnitude and eﬀects across Europe. Our ﬁnding
shows that what is relevant in the determination of the diﬀerentials it is
the pace and intensity at which technological progress takes place. We
turn then to institutions and we build a model of imperfect competition
and wage bargaining which relate the diﬀerentials to the technological
progress but also to several labour market institutions. The empirical
analysis on this aspect reveal that employment rates of diﬀerent groups
as well as the union density and the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts
are indeed important and help in explaining the evolution of the wage
diﬀerentials between skilled and unskilled workers.
1 Introduction
The notion that the wage diﬀerentials between skilled and unskilled depend on
the technological change seems to be a consolidated fact. This relationship may
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1vary in its magnitude through time and space, but most of the empirical analyses
on this subject conclude that the skilled workers beneﬁt relatively more from the
progress in technology than the unskilled: what we observe then, is skill biased
technological change (SBTC). Most of the evidence comes from the US, with
Katz and Murphy (1992) being probably the ﬁrst and most inﬂuential analy-
sis and with several other papers conﬁrming the presence of SBTC: Acemoglu
(2001) is one of the most relevant, trying to endogenize SBTC, while Beaudry
and Greene (2003) update the analysis of Katz and Murphy with more recent
data. A smaller number of papers have appeared covering evidence from the
rest of the world: works by Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Machin and
Van Reenen (1998) tackles the consequences of technological change examining
a larger groups of countries.
The basic idea for this relationship starts from the observation that the
relative supply of skilled workershas been increasing in all industrial country and
it is not usually accompanied by a decrease in the wage diﬀerentials. Since we
do not observe a fall of the diﬀerentials while the factor becomes relatively more
abundant, there must be something which is also increasing the labour demand
for skilled. Several explanations are possible for this shift in the demand, but
the one which seems to be conﬁrmed by the above analysis is that (skill biased)
technological change is the cause of the shift. The other possible explanations
lay in the rise in the international commerce, which increased the competition
with less developed countries and decreased low skilled wages, or on changes in
the labour market conditions. The former has been widely studied but evidence
of it has been hardly found while the latters did not receive much attention,
with only a few articles focusing on them.
In this paper we focus on the wage gap between workers who hold a graduate
degree (what we consider the skilled) and those who does not hold such a degree
(the unskilled). This measure is similar to the one used in Katz and Murphy
(1992) and Beaudry and Greene (2003) but has rarely been analysed outside
US. We have data covering 10 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and UK, in a time span that
range from the beginning of the nineties to the beginning of the new century.
There are no oﬃcial data that measures the ratio of wage of graduate and non
graduate and we derive such values starting from surveys on workers: the British
Household of Panel Studies for UK (BHPS), the German Socio Economic Panel
for Germany (GSOEP) and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
for the rest of the countries.
The diﬀerentials have an evolution quite diﬀerent across those countries: in
some they rise, in other decrease and in a few stay constant. Overall, the average
ratio of the wages of the two groups of workers is quite comparable through the
countries, ranging from 1.424 in Denmark to 1.756 in Spain (and Spain has a
remarkable higher ratio than the rest of the countries). On the contrary, the
relative supply of skilled workers is increasing in all country (with the partial
exception of Ireland) but it greatly diﬀers in its average level: from 0.11 in
A u s t r i at o0 . 7 7i nU K .O b v i o u s l yt h i sg reat variety is due to the diﬀerences in
the participation rates to tertiary education but also in the diﬀerences that the
2concept of ”graduate degree” assumes in diﬀerent countries.
The diﬀerences in the evolution of the wage diﬀerentials pose an interesting
puzzle when compared to the common growth of relative supply. From our
starting consideration on the role of technological change, there are a couple
possible explanations to this behaviour: technological change does not happens
at the same rate in diﬀerent (through quite similar and near) countries so that
using a common trend to measure it is misleading; 2) technological change
happens at a similar rate, but its eﬀects is diﬀerent in diﬀerent countries, being
less (or non) biased in certain countries than in others; or 3) a combination of
the two. To disentangle these possibilities is the ﬁrst of our goals.
Obviously, the diﬀerent evolutions may also be explained by the other fac-
tors. One of them is international trade, which we take into account in our
analysis but that we not tackle in particular, as there are several papers on this
subject that conclude that such eﬀect is at the most feeble. On the contrary, we
do focus on the role if institutions in the labor market, something that has hardly
been done before. In particular we want to examine a context where wages are
determined through union bargaining and we want to determine whether some
elements like beneﬁts generosity, employment protection and union density may,
favoring some groups of worker over the other, help in explaining the evolution
of the diﬀerentials.
The work is organized as follows: section two explains how we derived our
data and brieﬂy describes them, section three introduces a theoretical model
which explain the determination of the diﬀerentials, both with and without the
wage bargaining; section four presents the econometrical analysis, ﬁrst focusing
on the technological change and then adding also the institutions; section ﬁve
concludes.
2D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
The main variables we are interest in is the wage ratio between graduate and
non graduate workers. There are no oﬃcial data describing this variable so that
we have to build it starting from national surveys on workers. What we need is
basically a measure of the average wage for workers who hold at least a graduate
degree (the skilled) and the average wage of the rest of the workers. The surveys
which we use in our analysis are the BHPS (from 1991 to 2003), the GSOEP
(from 1992 to 2003) and the ECHP (from 1994 to 2001) which contains data on
income, education attainment and other demographic and economic information
of individual workers.
For each workers we obtain a measure of his wage using the ”current gross
wage” variable and weighting it by the weekly working hours. We do not con-
sider data on self employed to obtain a more comparable and trustworthy mea-
sure of wages. As for the data on education attainment, we rely on the Inter-
national Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED) and we consider him a
graduate (and skilled) workers if he has an ISCED level of at least 5 (which is
deﬁned as ﬁrst stage of tertiary education).
3On principle we could simply calculate the average wage of skilled and un-
skilled in a given year in a given country, however we would like to remove from
such a measure some possible compositional eﬀects which may inﬂuence it but
that are not particularly relevant for our analysis. In particular it is possible
that the composition in terms of gender and working experience inside each
group change over time, inﬂuencing the wage diﬀerential. Since we are not in-
terested in variations due to compositional change we want to remove them. We
proceed then to build a series of skill premium cleaned-up from these composi-
tional eﬀects: to do that we adopt the procedure presented in Katz and Murphy
(1992), which we describe in what follows.
What we do is to group and weight data to obtain a homogeneous compo-
sition of workers so that the inﬂuences on wages of experience and gender is
removed. To obtain this, we divide the sample into the two educational groups.
For each group (skilled and unskilled) we pick out 6 classes of experience (0-2
years, 3-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40 and 41 and more), in turn divided by gender.
Through this we obtain two matrices of 12 cells every year: each cell identiﬁed
workers of a given gender and of a given experience. For each cell, and for each
year studied, we calculate the average wage of skilled and unskilled workers us-
ing the current gross wage divided by the number of weekly working hours. The
average wages per cell are assembled in two yearly values: one for skilled and
one for unskilled. We then obtain the aggregate average wages as the weighted
average of all the cells in a matrix. The weights are the same for all the years
(allowing us to take away the compositional eﬀects) and are computed as the
average through time (for each single country) of the occupational rate (the
share of workers belonging to that cell over the total workers) in each cell. Once
we obtained the average wages for both kinds of workers we compute their ratio.
The other important variable that we need for our analysis is the ratio of
labour supply between graduate and undergraduate workers. A simple measure
of this would be the ratio of the total weekly hours worked between the skilled
and the unskilled. However, we would like to aggregate quantities of work
that are homogeneous in terms of eﬃciency units. Then, following the previous
literature on this subject, we suppose that real wage is a measure of the eﬃciency
of each unit. Once again we pick a country separately and we divide the workers
into two matrices of 12 cells every year, as seen before. For each cell, and for
each year studied, we calculate the sum of weekly hours worked by all the
workers and the average wage. The supply of the skilled (or of the unskilled) is
then obtained through a weighted aggregation of the total weekly hours in each
cell of a given year. These weights are given by the ratio between the average
through time of the wage of each cell over the average through time of the wage
of a particular cell chosen as reference. Finally, we generate our time series of
relative supply as the ratio between the annual supply of skilled and that of
unskilled workers.
In all we obtain data on the following countries1: Austria (1995-2001), Bel-
1While ECHP survey covered also Luxembourg, Netherland and Sweden the quality of
those data was not good enough to obtain a measure of wage diﬀerentials. In particular:
4gium (1994-2001), Denmark (1997-2001), Finland (1996-2001), Germany (1992-
2005), Greece (1994-2001), Ireland (1994-2001), Italy (1994-2001), Spain (1994-
2001) and UK (1991-2003).
2.1 An overview of the data
We start showing the average share of skilled employed workers on total em-
ployed workers2 in each country in the related years (ﬁgure 1.a).
The shares are quite diﬀerent across the nations and range about 10% in
Italy and Austria to the nearly 50% of Belgium and UK with an average across
countries of 29,4%. Obviously such a variability is both due to the diﬀerent
participation of the population to the tertiary education and to diﬀerences in
the exact deﬁnition of ’graduate degree’ (and on how diﬃcult and qualifying is
obtaining it).
This wide variability is not met by a comparable phenomenon in the ratio
between the wages of graduate and non graduate workers (see ﬁgure 1.b). This
variable seems to be rather stable across the countries: from around 1.43 in
Denmark and Belgium to 1.756 in Spain, with an average of 1.53. The general
impression from a comparison of countries averages is that those countries with
a lesser (greater) share of graduate workers do not display higher (lower) wage
diﬀerential: countries with low relative supply, like Italy and Austria, have below
average wage diﬀerentials, while those with high relative supply like UK and
France has average diﬀerentials and quite high diﬀerential respectively. Only in
Belgium a very high share of skilled workers correspond to one of the lowest wage
diﬀerential. Overall, the negative relationship between diﬀerentials and relative
supply does not to arise from a comparison among countries averages. In any
case we are more interested in the evolution through time of these variables
inside each country. The time patterns of the share of graduate is shown for
each country in ﬁgure 2.
The patterns are clearly similar for most of the countries with an upward
trend in the relative supply of graduate. The only exception is Ireland where
this variable has been pretty much constant. Note that even if the increase in
Austria and Italy seems visually modest, this is due to the scale of the graph
(in Austria it rose from 8,66% to 11,95% and in Italy from 9,66% to 11,31%).
The same homogeneity of behaviour is not found in the evolution of the
wage diﬀerentials (ﬁgure 3). Whereas almost all countries increased the share
data on Luxembourg do not cover gross income: the educational data on Netherland are
clearly uncorrect (according to them only around 5% of workers achieved more than primary
education) and data on Sweden cover to too few years. Things are diﬀerent for Portuguish
data which are complete enough to calculate their wage diﬀerentials. However the result is
completely out of scale with an average value of the wage ratio above 3 whereas the average of
the other countries is around 1.52. We do not know whether this is due to the quality of data
or if they reﬂect the real portuguish situation, but in order not to comprimise this analysis
we prefer not to use them.
2The measure is given by the total weighted work hours of skilled workers over total work
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Figure 1: (a) Share of workers holding a graduate degree. (b) Skilled-Unskilled
Wage Ratio
of skilled work, the wage diﬀerential shows a variety of patterns. In Austria,
Belgium, Denmark and Finland is increasing, in France, Ireland, Spain and UK
is decreasing while in Germany and Italy it does not have a clear trend.
If we still have in mind the basic model which explain the magnitude of
the wage gap on the base of the scarcity of skilled workers we ﬁnd ourself with
much left unexplained. Not only the basic inverse relationship between relative
wages and relative supply is not conﬁrmed in several cases but moreover the
same phenomenon produce diﬀerent outcomes. Even if we introduce the eﬀect
of technology and the demand shift it may produce, it is quite clear that the
demand shift was diﬀerent in diﬀerent countries so that the technological change
cannot be seen as a common trend (or if the technological change was the same,


















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: The evolution of the wage diﬀerentials in the European countries
83 Theoretical Model
We want give a theoretical foundation to the relationship between the wage
diﬀerentials, the relative supply and the technological change. To do that we
start building a model of perfect competition and we move then to a model of
imperfect competition and wage bargaining.
3.1 Perfect competition
We assume that the production function3 is given by
Y = α(aS)
γ +( 1− α)(bU)
γ (1)
where S is the quantity of skilled labour, U the quantity of unskilled labour,
a and b are two productivity parameters and α measures how the two factors
are aggregated. The parameter γ determines the returns to scale, which are the
same for both factors: we assume diminishing return so that γ<1. We imagine
that S and U are exogenous variables.








= wu =( 1− α)γb(bU)γ−1. (2a)





(1 − α)bγ(bU)γ−1 (3)
or, we if we call wR the logarithm of the above ratio:
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This is what we will refer to as the wage diﬀerentials: from the equation
above we can state that as long as the parameters are constant, the relative
wage is solely determined by the relative supply. If, following an increase in the
relative supply S/U we do not observe a decrease in the wage ratio, then the
parameters must have changed, that is, a shift in demand has occurred. It is
quite obvious that both the parameter a and b should increase through time as
an eﬀect of the technological change, however, this is not enough to modify the
relative wages. As long as the ratio a/b is constant the change in productivity
has no eﬀects on the diﬀerentials. Instead if one of the parameter grow at an
3We choose this particular functional form to allow tractability of the problem when, later,
we introduce wage bargaining. As long as we stick to the perfect competition framework, we
could have adopted standard Cobb-Douglas and CES function obtaining similar results.
9higher rate than the other, then this aﬀects the wage diﬀerentials and we observe
biased technological change.
We can imagine that technological level (and its change) may be measured,
in a given period t,b yt h ev a r i a b l eTt then we can write (4) as
wR = C + ρTt + σRt (5)
where C is a constant and Rt is the exogenous relative supply at time t.
If the parameter ρ>0 then the technological change is biased in favor of the
skilled, while if it is zero, we do not observe any eﬀect of technology. One of
the obvious problem is the measurement of Tt: this is usually approximated by
a time trend. Under this interpretation, the technology level keeps increasing
at a constant rate and if ρ>0, at each increase of the technology level the
productivity of skilled workers grows more than those of the unskilled. The
explanation that is usually brought forth for this is that skilled workers are
better in exploiting more complex technologies, so that their reward for their
skills grows with the technological level. In any case the adoption of a time
trend to approximate the technological level is probably a too simple approach:
we will propose diﬀerent ways to measure Tt in the section 4 and see how they
perform empirically.
3.2 Imperfect competition and wage bargaining
We want now to examine the role of institutions in the labour market in order to
understand how they could aﬀect the wage diﬀerentials. To do that we introduce
wage bargaining but, in order to make the problem analytically tractable, we
try to keep the model as simple as possible. We imagine now that there are two














where pi are the relative prices, ε the elasticity of demand and θ an index of
aggregate demand. The latter two parameters are the same for both kind ﬁrms.
The workers are organized in a union which bargains on the wages of both
groups. The aim of the union is maximising its utility Θ which is given by the













where λ is the relative importance given by the union to the unskilled work-
ers. An higher λ implies that the union cares relatively more about the unskilled
and will try to favour them during the bargaining.
As for the ﬁrms, they are orgainized in a confederation that bargains with
the union trying to maximise the proﬁts of both kind of ﬁrms (πi and πj re-
spectively); its objective function is:
Π=πi + πj =( piYi − wsS)+( pjYj − wuU). (9)
The two parties (the union and the confederation of ﬁrms) bargain over the
wage and the ﬁrms are then free to set the amount of labour that they desire
(as in the right to manage model of bargaining): this means that the solution
of the bargaining must lay on the labour demand of ﬁrms, which is obtained
imposing the condition dπi
dS =0f o rﬁ r m si and
dπj
dU =0f o rﬁ r m sj.W eo b t a i n
the labour demands maximizing the proﬁts with respect to employment, their

















where µ = ε−1
ε and K = θ−ε.
The solution of the bargaining is given by the couple of real wage which
maximise the Nash Maximandum which takes in consideration parties’ utility,
subject to conditions (10) and (10a):
⎧
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where β is barganing power of the union and it ranges from 0 to 1. Inserting
equation (8) and (9) in the above problem and imposing the conditions (10) and
(10a) we have





















1−γµ (1 − γµ)













































s Π−βΘβ−1 = 0 (13a)





















+( γµ− 1)logλ. (15)
The relative wage has a component similar to the case of perfect competi-
tion, as it still depends on the ratio of the productivity parameters, but it now
depends also on the outside options and on the preferences of union. We can
still assume that the ratio a/b is related to the technology and we can imagine
that the ratio between the reservation wages depends on the probability of each
group of ﬁnding a job and on the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts. The
preference of the unions may be related to union density if it is true that larger
unions promote wage compression. In anycase it is worth to note that the bar-
gaining power of the union does not enter, at least directly, directly in the wage
ratio; the same is true of the relative supply which is now endogenous. We will
better discuss this relationships in the following part, where we try to ﬁnd a
way to measure these variables.
4 Empirical analysis
In this part we turn to the empirical evidence on wage diﬀerentials and we look
for a conﬁrmation of the above models. We start from the ﬁrst one, focusing on
the role of technological change and we move then to the second, introducing the
institutions. In both the cases, before estimating the models, we discuss which
are reasonable proxies for some of variables we are interested and which should
be, in the light of the models we presented above, their role in the determination
of wage diﬀerentials.
4.1 Technological Change
According to the ﬁrst model we presented, the relative wages depends on the
relative supply of skilled workers and on a variable which measure the relative
12productivity of skilled with respect to unskilled workers: this variable should be
related to the technological progress. If we add a country speciﬁc constant we
can estimate the following model:
w
R
i,t = C + ci + ρTi,t + σRi,t + εi,t
where wR
i,t is the log-ratio between skilled and unskilled wage in country
i, Ri,t the relative supply of skilled workers (measured in log) and Ti,t the
technological variable; C and ci are the constant terms with the latter being
country speciﬁc.
We could use several proxies to measure T, and depending on which we
choose, we imply a diﬀerent mechanism that links technology to the relative
productivity: in any case, should the ρ be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero this
would indicate the presence of biased technological progress (skill-biased for
ρ>0).
The ﬁrst way to approximate the technological progress is through a linear
trend. That would imply that technological progress happens at a steady pace
that is the same in all the countries and that has the same eﬀect across them.
We test the above model with a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator and the result are given
in the column (i) of table 1.
The results clearly shows that a common time trend is not present. This
was not unexpected because we already noticed that while the relative supply
of skilled workers was increasing almost everywhere, the wage diﬀerentials were
having diﬀerent evolutions in diﬀerent countries, so that they could not be
experiencing a common trend. We also ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the relative
supply is negative (though signiﬁcant only at the 10%), which is line from what
our theoretical model predicted.
If we still believe that technological progress is relevant in explaining the
evolution of wage diﬀerentials, we need then a variable that can measure the
diﬀerences in the technology in each nation. Our next attempt is to measure
the technological level as the cumulated sum through the years of the R&D
expenditure over the GDP. In practice we normalize to zero the technological




where R&Di,y indicate the expenditures in year y. Obviously it is possible
that the starting technological level is diﬀerent in diﬀerent in nations but such
(likely) case would be captured by the country speciﬁc constant and would not
be a problem. We present the results in column (ii) of table 1. Once again,
the technological variable is not statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the
technological level on itself does not imply a bias toward a certain category of
workers.
We turn then to a diﬀerent approach and we imagine that the relevant
factor is the intensity of the technological change. We can then measure the
technological variable directly through the R&D expenditure, in practice we
set Ti,t ≡ R&Di,t. The results of the estimation (column (iii), table 1) are













  Wage Differentials  Wage Differentials  Wage Differentials 
Relative Supply  -0.075* -0.074***  -0.079*** 
  (0.038) (0.028) (0.016) 
Time Trend  0.001    
  (0.002)    
Cumulated R&D   0.004  
    (0.006)   
R&D     0.200*** 
     (0.037) 
Constant  0.340*** 0.365*** 1.162*** 
  (0.050) (0.018) (0.149) 
     
Observations 93  85  85 
Number of ID  11  10  10 
R-squared 0.08 0.14  0.38 
      
Standard errors in parentheses.       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 1: Regressions for the wage diﬀerentials in the perfectly competititive
case
to be strongly correlated to the relative wages. The interpretation is that the
technological bias comes from the pace of the progress, not from the progress
itself. Under this view, skilled workers seems to be quicker to adapt so that they
take advantage in rapid changes in technology. This ﬁnding is indeed interesting
and allow us to identify in the intensity of technological change one of the
driving force in the evolution of wage diﬀerentials between skilled and unskilled.
The relationship between intensity and diﬀerentials can also be seen plotting
the change in the wage diﬀerentials against the change in R&D expenditures
measured as the log ratio of the ﬁnal and initial values in each country (ﬁgure
4).
Obviously this is only an intuitive representation of the relationship, as it
neglect the evolution of the variable and focus only on the ﬁrst and last values.
Nonetheless the relationship is striking clear and positive with countries with
growing R&D expenditures having an increase in wage diﬀerentials and vice-
versa. The ﬁgure also explains the division in groups of countries that we made
in the previous section: Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Finland had increas-
ing diﬀerentials and are in the top right of the ﬁgure with R&D expenditures
14Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium
Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark
Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland
France France France France France France France France
Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland
Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy
Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain
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Figure 4: Growth of Wage Ratio against Growth of R&D expenditures
increasing as well. Germany and Italy are in the centre, with stable diﬀerentials
and RD. Finally, in the bottom left we ﬁnd France, Ireland and UK with de-
creasing diﬀerentials and RD: only Spain remains partly out of this description,
with a slightly increase in RD but falling diﬀerentials. Note also that according
to the above ﬁgure, a costant R&D would be associate to decreasing diﬀeren-
tials: this is not a real issue because the graph is neglecting the eﬀect of relative
skilled supply that was increasing througout the period in nearly all countries.
To better explore this relationship, to analyse diﬀerences across countries and
to check how robust our speciﬁcation is, we allow now for the technological eﬀect
due to the RD intensity to diﬀer across country. This allows us to determine
whether the magnitude (and the sign) of the skill bias is the same in diﬀerent
countries. We proceed in estimating
wi,t = C + ci + αRi,t + βiTi,t + εi,t
where the coeﬃcient βi is speciﬁc to country i. This speciﬁcation comes
with some problems as the number of independent variables is rather high with
respect to the number of observations so that our estimates cannot be very
15eﬃcient. Nonetheless this is still gives a ﬁrst idea of the diﬀerences across
countries. We present the results in table 2: in it for each country, we present
the coeﬃcient associated to their R&D expenditures.
It is easy to see that most of the countries, once we have taken into account
the standard errors, have coeﬃcients that are reasonably close to each other.
The exceptions are France which has a higher coeﬃcient, Finland which is a
bit lower than the average and Spain which has a negative (but not signiﬁcant)
coeﬃcients. The latter case is the only result that create some concerns as it does
not ﬁnd a explanations in the theory (unless, of course, we suppose that in Spain
we observe unskilled biased technology). A possible explanation for this, may
come from the fact that Spanish labour market was undergoing several changes
in the period of analysis, with a strong increase in the ﬂexibility of it. Given the
reforms Spain went under, it is likely that new entrant workers ended up having
ﬁxed term contracts in contrast to the incumbents workers which mostly had
permanent contract. The combination of the fact that the new entrants have
an higher share of skilled (due to an increase in tertiary education attainment)
if compared to the incumbents and that ﬁxed term job are generally less paid
than permanent one, may explain the decline in the wage diﬀerential. From a
statistical point of view we can test the equality of the coeﬃcients: the results
(which are reported in table 2) indicates that we have to refuse the equality of
the coeﬃcients when we consider also Spain, but we cannot refuse it for all the
rest of the countries.
This far we have neglected the eﬀect of international commerce on the wage
diﬀerentials. While we did not introduce a formalized model we discussed before
that competition from less developed countries may induce a reduction of the
non skilled wage and thus increase the diﬀerentials. To control for this we
introduce in the regression a measure of the international competition. The
simplest way to do this is to simply consider the share of imports of good and
service other the GDP. We use this measure in regression (i) of table 3 but we
fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of international competition.
Obviously the share of imports is a crude approximation: what in we need in
fact is a measure of the international competition only from the less developed
countries. We proceed then to build a much more accurate measure which we
have called adjusted imports. This variable is given by the total imports from
non developed countries4 less the imports of mineral fuels (oil, carbon and gas)
from those countries and it should be able to capture the competition that
unskilled intensive goods suﬀer because of international commerce. The results
of using this variable is given5 in regression (ii) of table 3. While the sign of this
variable is, as we should expect, positive, it is still not signiﬁcant: even when
properly measured, competition from less developed countries does not seem to
be relevant.
4This is obtained subtracting from total imports the imports from Euro-15 countries, Aus-
tralia, Japan, New Zeland, Norway, Switzerland and US. While some minor developed country
are still present, their impact should be negligible.
5We were able to construct the adjusted imports only for the years after 1994. This explain
the reduction in the observations.
16  Wage Differentials 
Relative Supply  -0.057** 
  (0.026) 
Austria  0.268*** 
  (0.081) 
Belgium  0.267** 
  (0.108) 
Denmark  0.201* 
  (0.119) 
Finland  0.041 
  (0.076) 
France  0.657*** 
  (0.245) 
Germany  0.197* 
  (0.109) 
Ireland  0.249* 
  (0.137) 
Italy  0.482** 
  (0.214) 
Spain  -0.241 
  (0.150) 
UK  0.301* 
  (0.160) 
Constant  1.360*** 
  (0.181) 
 
Observations 85 
Number of Countries  10 
R-squared 0.54 
 




F(  8,    64) =    1.44 
Prob > F =    0.1979 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 







  Wage Differentials  Wage Differentials 
Relative Supply  -0.065*** -0.070** 
  (0.02) (0.029) 
R&D  0.216*** 0.158*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) 
Imports  -0.033  
  (0.03)  
Adjusted Imports   0.010 
    (0.03) 
Constant  1.207*** 1.02*** 
  (0.15) (0.028) 
    
Observations 85  73 
Number of ID  10  10 
R-squared 0.392  0.404 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3: Regression with controls for the international commerce
4.2 The role of Institutions
We now turn to evaluate how institutions can aﬀect the wage diﬀerentials. In
our theoretical discussion we introduce the mechanism of wage bargaining and
we concluded that in such a context the relative supply is not relevant (as it
is not exogenous) and the wage diﬀerential should depend from the relative
productivity of workers (which might be related to technological progress) but
also on the reservation wage (which depends on the employment possibilities
and on unemployment beneﬁts) and the preferences of unions. In general, these
factors should be relevant only if they diﬀers across our two groups while it is
well likely that some institutions, or at least labour legislation, it is the same
for both the groups. In all, we are going to use the following variables: employ-
ment rates of skilled and unskilled (which measure the probabilities of ﬁnding
a job), replacement ratio (RR) and beneﬁts duration (BD) (which determines
the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts) and the overall6 union density (UD)
and employment protection level (EPL) (which can be thought to be a proxy
6In principle there could exist an exact measure of union density for each group, but we
do not have such data nor we know any possible source for it.
18of overall bargaining power and possibly of the unions preference)7.O n t h e
contrary, starting from the survey we are using, we can build a measure for the
employment rate of the two diﬀerent groups.
In any case, even when the institution and the variable measuring it, are
they same, we have reason to believe that it may have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
reservation wages and bargaining power of the two groups: in what follow we
describe the variables and we explain what eﬀect we should expect.
Employment rates should measure the employment opportunity of a worker
and it is the only variable which can be eﬀectively measured distinguishing be-
tween the skilled and unskilled. We obtain it from the surveys and, for each
group (graduate and non graduate) is given by the number of workers that are
employed over the sum of them plus those workers that declare being unem-
ployed and searching for a job. The eﬀect of this variable should be quite clear:
when the employment rates of a certain group are high it means that it is easy
to obtain a job for people belonging to that group so that their outside op-
tion should be better. We measure diﬀerences in the employment opportunities
through the ratio of the employment rate of the skilled and those of the unskilled
and we expect that this variable has a positive eﬀects on wage diﬀerentials.
The replacement ratio measures the share of the past wage that an un-
employed worker receive when is out of work and entitled to unemployment
beneﬁts. It follows that this variable should be more relevant in the determina-
tion of reservation wage for the group whose past wage are on average higher,
which in our case should be the skilled: the relationship between RR and the
wage diﬀerential should then be positive.
The duration of unemployment beneﬁts measures the maximum length of
the unemployed beneﬁt. The same reasoning we made for the reservation wage
should be true for the beneﬁt duration: however, it must be stressed that the
group which shows higher employment probability could take less advantage of
a long duration. Since in our case the skilled have almost always an higher
probability, the ﬁnal eﬀect is dubious.
Union density is the percentage of workers that are members of a union.
This variable is usually associated to the bargaining power of union, which in
our model should have no eﬀect on the wage ratio. However, there is evidence
that unions are able to compress wages, so that the eﬀect could be negative,
even if there is no clear evidence that this compression happens also in the
diﬀerentials between graduate and non graduate. On the other side we can think
of at least two reason why its eﬀect should be positive: ﬁrst of all the bargained
wage depends on the outside options and it may possible that bargaining power
amplify the diﬀerences in the starting position, so that the group of worker with
better outside option gain more from a high bargaining power. However, our
theoretical model failed to capture such interaction. In addition there may be
a relation between the union density and the composition of the members: it
is likely that when only few workers belongs to unions, those members belong
to the unskilled group (that probably forms the core of the unions) while the
7The source of data for RR, UD and EPL is OECD; for BD is Nickell (2006).
19relative number of skilled members increase with the increase of union density.
Then we could observe a shift in the preferences of the union (from the unskilled
to the skilled) as its density increase. The overall eﬀect is then uncertain.
The employment protection level is an artiﬁcial variable that measure the
rigidity of the labour market. It should not directly aﬀect the wage but it is
possible that high protection increase the bargaining power of workers making
them less likely to be ﬁred when too high bargained wages generate an excess
in the number of employers. As discussed above, a stronger bargaining power
may promote wage compression but it might also amplify the diﬀerences in the
outside options of the groups. This mechanism is in anycase dubious so its eﬀect
on the diﬀerentials is uncertain.
Now that we have introduced the variables we use, we perform the estimation
of the following equation:
wi,t = C + ci + αei,t + βTi,t + γ1RRi,t + γ2BDi,t + γ3UDi,t + γ4EPLi,t + εi,t
and we show the results in column (i) of table 4 (we do not have data on
institutions of Greece, so we omitted it from the regression).
The estimation are quite in line with what we would expect. They conﬁrm
that the ratio of employment rate as well as the replacement ratio have a positive
eﬀects on the diﬀerentials. On the contrary, the duration of beneﬁts has a
negative eﬀect, implying that skilled workers tend to take less advantage of
beneﬁts that last long periods. The result on union density seems to negate that
unions induce wage compression, at least between the skilled and unskilled; on
the contrary the employment protection level is not relevant. As we discussed
before, a possible explanation for the positive eﬀect of union density is that
the composition and the preferences of unions shift to favour the skilled as the
union density increase. The other possibility, that is, that is an amplifying of
the outside options of the groups is less likely, because in that case EPL should
be signiﬁcant as well, something which we excluded.
Since we saw earlier that Spain has a diﬀerent coeﬃcient for R&D from
the rest of countries we allow in regression (ii) for this diﬀerence. The results
do not change much and we also ﬁnd out that the coeﬃcient for Spain, while
still negative, is not statistically diﬀerent from the others (though the result
is borderline): it is possible that the introduction of the institutions helped in
explaining part of the Spanish uniqueness.
Finally, the R&D expenditures are still signiﬁcant, conﬁrming once again the
fact that the skill bias originate from the intensity of the technological change.
Even if we do not produce here the results for reason of space, we also tried to
run regressions were we used the cumulated R&D expenditure as a measure of
the technological progress together with all the above institutions: the results
showed once again this variable is not signiﬁcant; ﬁnally, we also tried to control
for the international competition but we obtained non signiﬁcant estimation.
20 (i) 
Common R&D coefficient 
(ii) 
Different R&D coefficient for Spain 
  Wage Differentials  Wage Differentials 
Employment Rate Ratio  0.326***  0.22* 
  (0.106) (0.125) 
R&D 0.197***  0.207*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
R&D for Spain    -0.056 
  (0.169) 
Raplacement Ratio  0.212***  0.201*** 
  (0.047) (0.052) 
Benefits Duration  -0.092**  -0.102*** 
  (0.037) (0.038) 
Union Density  0.12**  0.101** 
  (0.047) (0.047) 
Employment Protection Level  0.02  0.0234 
  (0.053) (0.032) 
Constant 0.031  0.041 
 (0.263) (0.260) 
    
Observations 75  75 
Number of Countries  10  10 
R-squared 0.51  0.54 
 
Test for the equality of  
the Spanish R&D coefficient 
  F(1,58) = 2.61 
Prob > F = 0.1114 
 
Standard errors in parentheses    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4: Regressions for the wage diﬀerentials in the imperfectly competititive
case
215 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the evolution of the wage diﬀerentials between
skilled (graduate) and unskilled (non graduate) workers in several european
countries in a period that stretch from the beginning of the nineties to the be-
ginning of this century. The main stylized fact for that period is that while all
european countries saw a rise in the relative supply of skilled workers, the evo-
lution of the wage diﬀerentials was widely diﬀerent across the countries. This
behaviour suggested not only that a simple supply and demand scheme is lack-
ing in explaining the evolution of the diﬀerentials but also that the adoption
of a common technological trend is not enough to identify the eﬀect of tech-
nological changes. In the ﬁrst part of our work we analysed the relationship
between technological progress and the wage diﬀerentials and we ﬁnd out that
the intensity of technological change, measured through the R&D expenditures,
seems to be the (technological) driving force of the wage diﬀerentials. The in-
terpretation of this result is that skilled workers are more able to adapt to the
change of technology so that they take advantage of periods of intense progress.
The diﬀerent degree of R&D across Europe helps us to explain the diﬀerences in
the evolution of the diﬀerentials. We also tried to take into account the eﬀect of
international competition of less developed countries, building what we believed
a good measure of it: the results seems to neglect any eﬀect of this factor.
We turned then to the labour market institutions, ﬁrst presenting a simple
theoretical model and then testing it with data. The introduction of institutions
shifts the attention to the analysis of the outside option of workers and how
institutions may interact with it. The impression is that as skilled workers
have better outside options, then stronger institutions may magnify this and
increase the wage diﬀerentials. The overall results is that institutions have
indeed a relevant role in the determinations of wage diﬀerentials and that partly
unexpectely, they do not produce wage compression between skilled and uskilled
workers.
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